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THE "CLEAREST COMMAND" OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
DENOMINATIONAL PREFERENCES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AND
PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIPS THAT CLASSIFY RELIGIONS
RicHARD F. DUNCANt
I. INTRODUCTION
"The clearest command of the Establishment Clause," according to the
United States Supreme Court, "is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another."1 The source of the idea animating this core
principle of nonestablishment is The Federalist Papers and Madison's insight
that "security" for religious liberty results from a level playing field upon which
a "multiplicity of sects" are free to compete with each other for adherents.2 As
the Court observed in Larson v. Valente,3 "Madison's vision - freedom for all
religion being guaranteed by free competition between religions - naturally
assumed that every denomination would be equally at liberty to exercise and
propagate its beliefs.",4  In other words, the clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is to require legislators and voters "to accord to their own
religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular
denominations. "
5
Although the command against denominational preferences is strong and
clear, there is much about Larson and its important doctrine that needs
clarification. For example, when do laws create denominational preferences?
Are they created when government enacts facially neutral laws that have a
disparate impact on different religions? Or are they created only when
government enacts denominational classifications directed at some "small, new,
or unpopular" religion? Or is it enough that a law explicitly treats some religious
institutions better than others? For example, suppose a zoning law conditions a
special use permit for a college or university to be located in a certain
T Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
1. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion[.]"). See generally Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict Scrntiny
For Denominational Preferences: Larson In Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 53 (2005).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351-52 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). "In a free
government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the
one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects." Id.; see Larson,
456 U.S. at 245. See also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (stating that under the
Establishment Clause, neither a State nor the federal government may "pass laws which. . . prefer one
religion over another.").
3. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
4. Id. at 245. As Justice Brennan put it, "the Religion Clauses were intended to ensure a benign
regime of competitive disorder among all denominations, so that each sect was free to vie against the
others for the allegiance of its followers without state interference." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
723 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Patrick-Justice, supra note 1, at 54-55.
5. Larson, 456 U.S. at 245.
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neighborhood upon a showing that the applicant is not a "pervasively sectarian"
institution or does not offer a degree or major in devotional theology. Does this
law create a denominational preference for religious colleges that are not
pervasively sectarian or for those that teach theology from a non-devotional, as
opposed to a devotional, perspective? 6 Suppose that instead of being contained
in a zoning law, these kinds of restrictions were enacted in an otherwise
generally available scholarship program for needy college students.
7
The purpose of this article is to analyze the Supreme Court's doctrine
prohibiting denominational preferences with a view toward mapping out the
boundaries of the doctrine in light of its animating principle of free religious
competition. I will then attempt to apply the "clearest command of the
Establishment Clause" to the facts of a recent free exercise decision of the Court,
Locke v. Davey.8 Although the Court in Davey rejected a free exercise challenge
to a state scholarship program that denied funding to students pursuing college
degrees in "devotional theology,"9 I will suggest that this exclusion creates a
denominational preference that appears to violate the Establishment Clause and
the teachings of Larson. Indeed, I will argue that Larson applies with particular
force in cases in which religious lines are drawn by funding laws in which the
benefit "if applied uniformly to all religions" would comply with the
Establishment Clause.
10
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DOCTRINE CONCERNING
DENOMINATIONAL PREFERENCES
A. THE CATEGORICAL RULE OF LARSON
In Larson v. Valente, Minnesota enacted a statute to regulate charitable
solicitations in order to protect the public and the beneficiaries of charitable
contributions from fraudulent practices.11  Under this enactment, certain
religious organizations were exempted from the law's registration and reporting
requirements. In particular, the law exempted "only those religious
organizations that received more than half of their total contributions from
members or affiliated organizations .... ,12
The Supreme Court held that the fifty percent rule created a denominational
preference, because it imposed "the registration and reporting requirements of
6. See Laurie Reynolds, Zoning The Church: The Police Power Versus The First Amendment, 64
B.U. L. REV. 767, 808-09 (1984), (reasoning that special use permits for churches to locate in certain
zoning areas conditioned "on a showing that the church's practices did not include 'shouting, wailing,
and moaning"' would create a denominational preference under Larson).
7. Cf Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
8. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
9. Id.
10. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1193 (2d ed. 1988).
11. 456 U.S. 228, 231 (1982).
12. Id at 231-32. In other words, the law's regulatory requirements were imposed "upon only
those religious organizations that solicit more than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers ......
Id. at 230.
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the Act on some religious organizations but not on others." 13  By selectively
conferring a "substantial advantage" on some religious charities, 14 the law
created a serious risk of politicizing religion by treating some religious
organizations as political insiders and others as political outsiders.
15
Interestingly, the
exemption in Larson was not based upon doctrinal differences between
favored and disfavored religious organizations, but rather on purely secular
factors concerning solicitation of funds from nonmembers. Arguably, the
Establishment Clause violation would be even clearer if the line drawn between
exempted and non-exempted religious organizations had been based upon certain
religious teachings or practices or on the degree of religiosity of different
denominations. 16
Under Larson, denominational preferences are subject to strict scrutiny
17
and will be struck down under the Establishment Clause unless the government
can demonstrate that the "suspect" religious classification is a necessary means
of advancing some compellingly important governmental end.1 8 As Professors
Rotunda and Nowak observe, "[i]t is difficult to imagine the circumstances under
which the government would have a compelling need to prefer some religions
over others."'19 In the words of the Court, equality of religious liberty under the
First Amendment is inconsistent with "an atmosphere of official denominational
preference."
20
Although some might argue that Larson is a free exercise decision
"parading in an establishment clause disguise[,]" 2 1 the decision pivots not on the
existence of a free exercise burden, but rather on the religious favoritism that
results when governmental benefits (including funding benefits and benefits in
the form of exemptions from governmental regulations) are selectively
distributed to favored religions.22 As Justice Brennan wisely observed in
13. Id. at 253.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 253-54. The legislative history involved in the Larson case demonstrated that the
Minnesota legislature carefully drafted the law to ensure that the Catholic Church was exempted from
the registration and reporting requirements and intended to target for regulation "religious organizations
which [were] soliciting on the street" and "n'nning around airports," and which were not "substantial
religious institutions" in Minnesota. Id. at 254.
16. See TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1191-92.
17. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.
18. Id. at 246-47. The Court concluded that "the fifty per cent rule ... is not closely fitted to the
furtherance of any compelling governmental interest" and "therefore violates the Establishment Clause."
Id. at 255.
19. 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 14 (3d ed. 1999).
20. Larson, 456 U.S. at245.
21. Jesse Choper, The Free Exercise Clause, in THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 1982-83, 79 (Jesse H. Choper, Yale Kamisar & Laurence H. Tribe eds., 1984).
22. Of course, denominational neutrality under the Establishment Clause, by guaranteeing a level
playing field for all religions, is a necessary condition for the robust religious liberty for all contemplated
by the Free Exercise Clause. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 245. In other words, "in Larson, the Court seemed
to recognize equality of free exercise as lying at the core of the establishment clause." Michael A.
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
[Vol, l-NN392
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Larson, governmental favoritism for some religions over others strikes at the
core of the Constitution's proscription of religious establishments. 23 Under this
reading of the Establishment Clause, "[t]he requirement of denominational
equality is designed to enhance the freedom and dignity of all religious
believers" and to "encourage a societal norm of religious toleration."
24
Unlike the Lemon test 25 and the "endorsement test,"26 the Larson test is a
categorical rule that does not require ad hoc determinations about whether a law
respecting religion has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion27 or
whether a reasonable observer would view the law as "endorsing religious
beliefs."28  Indeed, Larson is perhaps best understood as creating a brightline
rule that classifies denominational preferences as laws that inherently have the
primary effect of advancing the preferred religions and inhibiting the non-
preferred religions.29 In other words, Larson adopts a per se rule under the
Establishment Clause forbidding-in the absence of a compelling justification-
laws that "utilize classifications based on denominational or sectarian affiliation
to extend benefits or to impose burdens. "
30
B. WHAT CONSTITUTES A "DENOMINATIONAL PREFERENCE"
A facially neutral law that does not classify on the basis of religion-such
as a zoning law that forbids the slaughter of animals in residential districts-
does not create a denominational preference under Larson even though it may
have a disparate impact on religions that practice animal sacrifice.3 In the
words of Justice O'Connor, under Larson a denominational preference exists-
ClauseAdjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 329 (1986).
23. Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.
24. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal
Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
25. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. See Allegheny County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
27. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (stating that to be valid under the Establishment Clause, a law must
have a "principal or primary effect.., that neither advances nor inhibits religion").
28. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 597. See id. at 632-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. Under the Lemon test, courts must make case-by-case, fact-dependent determinations
concerning the primary effect of a law that touches upon religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
However, under Larson 'S prohibition of denominational preferences, laws that extend benefits or impose
burdens on the basis of religion are deemed automatically to have the primary effect of advancing the
favored denominations and inhibiting the disfavored denominations. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that under Larson "intentional discrimination
among religions" creates "a presumption, which may be overcome by a showing of compelling purpose
and close fit, that the challenged government conduct constitutes an endorsement of the favored religion
or a disapproval of the disfavored").
30. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 605 (1995). "Government cannot
purposefully discriminate among religions, nor utilize classifications based on denominational or
sectarian affiliation to extend benefits or to impose burdens." Id.
31. Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 n.23. See Philip Manns, Charting the Spectrum of Prohibited and
Permitted Aid to Religion, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 319, 364 ("a regulation's disparate impact among
religious organizations standing alone does not constitute a denominational preference"). However, if
there is evidence that a facially neutral requirement was purposefully designed to discriminate between
religions, then "a denominational preference might be found." Id. at 3 64-65.
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and strict scrutiny is required-only when "a statute or practice.., plainly
embodies an intentional discrimination among religions.... ,,32 The clearest
examples of unlawful denominational preferences involve laws, like the one
challenged in Larson itself, which facially classify on the basis of religion by
drawing a line between religious organizations that receive a benefit or some
other preference from government and those that do not.33  A religious
classification exists whenever government prefers a particular religion by
name34 or, as in Larson itself, distinguishes between religions based upon
identifiable characteristics such as sources of funding or doctrinal distinctions.
3 5
Perhaps the most difficult case to analyze under the Larson test is Gillette v.
United States.3' Gillette, which was decided a little more than a decade prior to
Larson and in the midst of our nation's bitter division over the Vietnam War,
37
concerned a federal law "providing exemptions from compulsory military
service for some religious conscientious objectors, but not others."38
Specifically, the federal selective service law in effect at the time exempted from
combat training and service "any person.., who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
3
Thus, the law classified on the basis of religious belief, exempting from combat
those religiously opposed to all war, but not those religiously opposed only to
particular "unjust" wars. As Professor Tribe observes, although the law did not
deny conscientious objector status to any particular denomination by name, the
law's distinction between different religious beliefs about war effectively denied
"conscientious objector status to Catholics, whose religion required them to take
part in just wars and to refuse to participate in unjust wars.'"4 1
In Gillette, the Court held that the draft law's distinction between religious
opposition to all wars and religious opposition only to particular wars did not
"reflect a religious preference"42 because "there [we]re neutral, secular reasons to
32. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
33. See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989). "Larson teaches that, when it is claimed
that a denominational preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law facially differentiates
among religions." Id.
34. Thus, a zoning law that limited special use permits to a single named denomination-say, to
Roman Catholic churches-would constitute a denominational preference triggering strict scrutiny under
Larson. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 1, at 109 (referring to laws that explicitly benefit only a "single,
named religious denomination" as a "paradigmatic" example of a denominational preference).
35. Thus, a zoning law that limited special use permits to colleges or universities that are not
"pervasively sectarian," or to churches that receive more than half of their funds from church members,
would also constitute a denominational preference triggering strict scrutiny under Larson. See Larson,
456 U.S. at 231-32.
36. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Jeremy Patrick-Justice calls Gillette "[t]he case most clearly and
viscerally implicating discrimination between religious beliefs." Patrick-Justice, supra note 1, at 65.
37. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 1, at 65.
38. Id.
39. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 441 (quoting Military Selective Service Act of 1967§ 60), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 4560) (1964 & Supp. V)).
40. Id. at 451-52.
41. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1192.
42. Gillette, 401 U.S. at454.
[Vol. NN394
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justify the line that Congress ha[d] drawn[.]"'43 Moreover, the Court concluded
that the distinction between different kinds of conscientious objections did not
"single out any religious organization or religious creed for special treatment."44
Is Larson "s strong prohibition of "denominational preferences" consistent
with the Court's earlier decision in Gillette? For example, should Larson come
out the other way if a state law regulating charitable solicitation exempted from
the law's registration and reporting requirements religious organizations that are
"conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form"? 45  Of course,
such an exemption may be considered irrational and arbitrary, because the
exemption does not appear to serve any secular purpose related to the issue of
charitable solicitation. But setting that objection aside, does this law create a
denominational preference under Larson? I think the answer is clear-of course
it does!
Although in Larson Justice Brennan distinguished Gillette as involving a
combat exemption that "was available on an equal basis to both the Quaker and
the Roman Catholic, despite the distinction drawn by the latter's church between
'just' and 'unjust' wars,"6 this attempt to distinguish the cases is "too absurd to
be taken seriously."'47  As Laurence Tribe has suggested, "[p]resumably the
Larson approach would replace the Gillette approach today, even though the
Gillette result would, in light of the Court's traditional deference to military
needs, probably remain the same."48 In other words, the draft exemption in
Gillette does enact a denominational preference, but the Court will likely defer to
the judgment of Congress that the classification is narrowly tailored to the
compelling interest of raising an army in a time of war.
49
In Hernandez v. Commissioner,50 the Court upheld a provision of federal
income tax law that permits taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions or gifts
only to the extent that the contribution or gift was "made with no expectation of
43. Id. at 449 n.14. The neutral, secular reasons for the distinction consisted of the need for
manpower in a time of war and the necessity of maintaining a fair system for selecting those who were
required to serve "when not all serve." Id. at 455. These governmental interests are arguably not only
reasonable, but are of compelling importance.
44. Id. at 451. Thus, a rule that exempted from combat those who believe Jesus forbids
participation in all wars, but not those who believe Buddha forbids participation in all wars, would
presumably have been recognized by the Gillette Court as an unconstitutional preference for one
religious creed over another.
45. See id. at 441.
46. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,247 n.23 (1982).
47. David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 769, 893 (1991). "Surely the Court would find that a law discriminated between religions-despite
the fact that it concerned only individual belief rather than group identification-if the law restricted a
government benefit to those who had accepted Jesus Christ as their savior." Id. See Patrick-Justice,
supra note 1, at 91 (suggesting that perhaps the Larson Court "did not think through carefully" its
attempt to distinguish Gillette).
48. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1192.
49. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006)
(stating that "'judicial deference.., is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its authority to raise
and support armies" (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,70 (1981))).
50. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
2010] 395
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a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift."51 Although this
law imposed a "disparate.burden on those charitable and religious groups that
rely on sales of commodities or services as a means of fundraising,"52 the law
was generally applicable and did not facially distinguish or differentiate among
religious denominations. 53 Although the Court upheld the law in question, it
made clear that strict scrutin•Y would have been required if the law facially
classified "among religions." For example, a law permitting taxpayers to
deduct charitable gifts made to non-pervasively sectarian-but not to pervasively
sectarian-religious institutions would facially discriminate between religions
and thus trigger strict scrutiny under Larson.
Moreover, in Hernandez, the Court seemed to acknowledge that an
unconstitutional denominational preference will be found if a facially neutral law
is administered or implemented selectively among religions. 55 For example, if a
facially neutral zoning law were implemented in a way that discriminated among
different religions, a denominational preference claim would likely succeed
under Larson's compelling interest test. Finally, as the Court made clear in
Board of Education v. Grumet,56 when a facially neutral law is shown to have
been gerrymandered to provide legislative favoritism, such as by bestowing
educational benefits "along religious lines,"57 this denominational preference
will trigger strict scrutiny under Larson.
58
C. SOME HELPFUL DECISIONS
As one commentator has observed, since deciding Larson in 1982, the
Supreme Court has not had occasion to apply its strict scrutiny test "to strike
down challenged legislation, nor has the Court ever explicitly held that the test
was even applicable." 59 This is not surprising. Laws discriminating on the basis
of religious denomination are rare,60 because Larson "s clear command against
religious classifications has wide acceptance. 61  As I will discuss at length
below, Larson " primary importance in the real world will likely be to prohibit
states from legislating denominational preferences in scholarship and other
51. Id. at 690.
52. Id. at 696.
53. Id. at 695.
54. Id.
55. fd. at 700-01. However, the Court declined to reach this issue in Hernandez in the absence of a
"proper factual record" demonstrating discriminatory application by the Internal Revenue Service. See
id. at 702-03.
56. 512 U.S. 687, 693, 702 (1994) (holding that a law creating a separate school district for the
"village of Kiryas Joel," although facially neutral, was designed to employ "religious criterion for
identifying the recipients" of educational benefits and authority).
57. Id. at 7O4.
58. Id. at 706-07.
59. Patrick-Justice, supra note 1, at 87.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 54. "Judges and commentators nearly unanimously agree that the Establishment
Clause forbids the government from preferring some religious denominations over other religious
denominations." Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. NN396
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funding programs. But before moving on to that analysis, I will discuss two
thoughtful decisions from the lower federal courts and a third case settled before
judgment that shine a,great deal of light on the proper functioning of the Larson
categorical rule.
1. The Case of the Religious Worker Who Refused to Join the Union
62In Wilson v. National Labor Relations Board, a Christian worker
challenged a provision of a collective bargaining agreement requiring employees
to become members of a labor union.63 The worker, Maurice Wilson, based his
opposition to union membership upon his personal religious beliefs and on his
interpretation of several passages from the Bible.
6 4
Section 19 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as then in force,
contained an exemption from required union membership for "[a]ny employee
who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional tenets or teachings
of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held conscientious
objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations .... "65
Although Wilson was a member of a Christian church, his church did not have
an established tenet or teaching about union membership.66 Thus, Wilson's
personal religious opposition to joining a union was not covered by the statutory
exemption.
Does Larson s categorical rule against denominational preferences apply to
Section 19 of the NLRA? The Sixth Circuit held that the statutory exemption
"facially differentiates among religions"67 and thus created a denominational
preference under Larson "by conferring a benefit on members of the religious
organizations described in the statute." Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny
and concluded that "section 19 violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."6
9
This victory proved a Pyrrhic one for Maurice Wilson, however, because
rather than extend the statutory accommodation to all religious dissenters
(including Wilson), the court instead held that the exemption was an
unconstitutional (and thus invalid) denominational preference under Larson.70
In other words, the Establishment Clause does not require Congress to enact a
religious accommodation for believers who object to mandatory union
membership under collective bargaining agreements; however, if Congress
chooses to enact an exemption, it must provide "a uniform benefit to all
religions" rather than engage in selective accommodations for certain
62. 920 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 1284.
64. Id. at 1284 n.1.
65. Id. at 1285-86 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 1284 n.1.
67. Id. at 1286.
68. Id. at 1287.
69. Id. at 1290.
70. Id. at 1290.
20101 397
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denominations.71
2. Special IHealth Care Benefits for Christian Science
In Children "s Healthcare Is A Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck,72 the plaintiffs
challenged certain preferential exemptions for Christian Science "sanitoria"
under the Medicare and Medicaid Acts.73  Specifically, the Acts contained 15
provisions explicitly exempting Christian Science sanitoria from regulations that
applied to other health care providers eligible to receive payment under the
Acts.74 As one commentator has observed, these selective exemptions "allowed
for tax expenditures to be used to subsidize the spiritual healing practices of a
single, named religious denomination."75  The court held that Larson s
categorical rule applied because the Medicare and Medicaid laws facially
differentiate among religions by singling out Christian Science sanitoria for
preferential treatment.
76
Moreover, when applying the strict scrutiny test the court made clear that
singling out one religion for accommodation was not a "close fit" for the
compelling governmental interest of ensuring that "all eligible citizens" receive
their fair share of healthcare benefits under Medicare and Medicaid.77 In other
words, a neutral law accommodating spiritual healing practices would have
satisfied the requirements of Larson and denominational equality.
78
3. Herein of Wiccan Soldiers and Selective Provision ofReligious Symbols on
Veterans 'Headstones
When an American veteran dies in active service, he or she is eligible to be
buried in a National Cemetery and to receive a headstone supplied by the federal
government.79  Although the government allows religious symbols to be
inscribed on veterans' headstones, not all religions have been included on the list
of recognized religious symbols promulgated by the Department of Veterans
Affairs.80 Moreover, the policy makes clear that only "approved emblems of
belief' are permitted to be inscribed on "Government-furnished
headstones .... 81
71. Id. at 1287.
72. 938 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Minn. 1996).
73. Since Christian Scientists believe that healing is "dependent on prayer instead of medical
technology," the Church has established its own facilities-called sanitoria-to practice spiritual healing.
Id. at 1469.
74. Id. at 1469-71.
75. Patrick-Justice, supra note 1, at 109.
76. Wladeck, 938 F. Supp. at 1473 (noting that "the sole distinguishing factor Larson espouses is a
differentiation between religious groups on the face of a statute").
77. Id. at 1480.
78. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 1, at 110 n.283.
79. David Rittgers, These Dishonored Dead: Veteran Memorials and Religious Preferences, 5
FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 400, 402 (2007).
80. Id. at 403.
81. This policy, together with the current list of approved "emblems of belief," is available at the
SOUTH DAKOTA LA W REVIEW [Vol. NN
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When Sergeant Patrick Stewart was killed in action in Afghanistan on
September 25, 2005,82 he should have been eligible for a religious symbol on his
grave marker. However, since Sgt. Stewart was a member of the Wiccan
religion, his widow's application for a religious symbol on his grave marker was
denied because the Wiccan Pentacle was not then among the government-
approved religious symbols.
83
Although the Department of Veterans Affairs recently agreed to add the
Wiccan Pentacle to the list of approved religious symbols in order to settle a
lawsuit, 84 the question remains whether religious discrimination by government
among religious symbols for the graves of veterans is permissible under the
Establishment Clause. Does this type of selective approval of religious symbols
trigger strict scrutiny under the Establishment Clause and Larson " categorical
rule concerning denominational preferences? Would it make any difference if
the discriminatory rule allowed religious symbols for the grave markers of all
veterans except those who attended a "pervasively sectarian college" or who
majored in "devotional theology?"
I agree with the conclusion reached by David Rittgers that this kind of
denominational discrimination by government almost certainly violates "the
Establishment Clause under the strict scrutiny standard of Larson . ,85 It is
difficult to think of any compelling justification for a rule that honors the
sacrifice of veterans who belong to approved religions while dishonoring the
sacrifice of those who belong to unapproved religions.
III. PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIPS THAT CLASSIFY RELIGIONS
How does the brightline rule against denominational discrimination apply
when a state awards college scholarships to young men and women to attend any
in-state college and pursue any course of study except "devotional theology"?
8 6
Or suppose a state awards scholarships to state residents to attend any college in
the state, including private religious colleges, but excludes from the program any
college that the state classifies as "pervasively sectarian"?
87
Do these kinds of religious classifications trigger strict scrutiny under
Larson and the rule against denominational discrimination? Or does the
Establishment Clause permit the states to discriminate along religious lines when
United States Department of Veterans Affairs website, Available Emblems of Belief for Placement on
Government Headstones and Markers, http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/hm/hmemb.asp (last visited March
15, 2010) [hereinafter United States Department of Veteran Affairs website].
82. See Rittgers, supra note 79, at 401.
83. Id. at 403. Although symbols were available for "Christians, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs,
and Hindus[,]" the government did not, at the time of Sgt. Stewart's death, recognize any religious
symbol suitable for Wiccans. Id.
84. See id. at 400; Neela Banerjee, Use of Wiccan Symbol on Veterans 'Headstones Is Approved,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at A21. For a current list of approved "emblems of belief," including the
Wiccan Pentacle, see the United States Department of Veteran Affairs website, supra note 81.
85. Rittgers, supra note 79, at 430.
86. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
87. See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
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deciding which college students are funded and which are not? Is there a
compellingly important governmental interest-or even a merely rational or
legitimate governmental interest-that justifies public scholarships that
discriminate between "sectarian" and "pervasively sectarian" religious colleges or
between "devotional" and "non-devotional" approaches to the study of theology?
We shall see.
A. COLORADO'S DISCRIMINATORY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
In Colorado Christian University v. Weaver,88 the state of Colorado had
adopted scholarship programs that could be used by eligible students to attend
any in-state college or university other than one found to be "pervasively
sectarian" by state officials. 89  As the Tenth Circuit emphasized, under this
statutory classification Colorado awarded scholarships "to students attending a
Methodist university and a Roman Catholic university run by the Jesuit
order[,]" 90 but "refused scholarships to otherwise eligible students attending a
non-denominational evangelical Protestant university and' a Buddhist
university."91 The reason for this discriminatory funding policy was because the
included colleges were classified as "sectarian" institutions, while the excluded
colleges were found to be "pervasively sectarian. "92
Under the Colorado scholarship programs, the difference between religious
colleges that were merely "sectarian" and those which were "pervasively
sectarian" turned primarily on whether state officials determined that "the
policies enacted by school trustees adhere[d] too closely to religious doctrine,
whether all students and faculty share[d] a single 'religious persuasion,' and
whether the contents of college theology courses tend[ed] to 'indoctrinate."'
93
Moreover, in order to determine whether a particular college was an eligible
"sectarian" institution rather than an ineligible "pervasively sectarian" institution,
state officials were required to make "intrusive judgments regarding contested
88. 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 1250.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1250, 1258.
93. Id. at 1250. The Colorado statutes governing the exclusion defined the term "pervasively
sectarian" only in the negative, by stating which education institutions "shall not be deemed pervasively
sectarian." The statutes provided:
(1) An institution of higher education shall be deemed not to be pervasively sectarian if it
meets the following criteria:
(a) The faculty and students are not exclusively of one religious persuasion.
(b) There is no required attendance at religious convocations or services.
(c) There is a strong commitment to principles of academic freedom.
(d) There are no required courses in religion or theology that tend to indoctrinate or
proselytize.
(e) The governing board does not reflect nor is the membership limited to persons of
any particular religion.
(f) Funds do not come primarily or predominantly from sources advocating a
particular religion.
See id. at 1250-51 (citations omitted).
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questions of religious belief or practice."'94 For example, in order to determine
whether Colorado Christian University's theology courses tended "to indoctrinate
or proselytize[,]" state officials "demanded to see syllabi" in order to empower
them "to discern the boundary between religious faith and academic theological
beliefs."95
In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion written by Circuit Judge McConnell,
the Tenth Circuit held that Colorado's discriminatory treatment of pervasively
sectarian colleges was "unconstitutional for two reasons: the program expressly
discriminates among religions without constitutional justification, and its criteria
for doing so involve unconstitutionally intrusive scrutiny of religious belief and
practice."'96  In other words, Colorado's discriminatory scholarship program
violated two different rules under the Establishment Clause - the rule prohibiting
denominational preferences and the ruie prohibiting "excessive entanglement"
between government and religion. 97  Although the anti-entanglement rule is
beyond the scope of this article, it is often inextricably intertwined with state
laws discriminating among religions, because classifying among religions often
requires government officials to entangle themselves with religious institutions
in order to determine which are the preferred and which are the disadvantaged.
As Judge McConnell made clear, "[flrom the beginning, this nation's
conception of religious liberty included, at a minimum, the equal treatment of all
religious faiths without discrimination or preference. "98 Thus, under Larson and
"the clearest command of the Establishment Clause[,]" Colorado's discriminatory
scholarship program was unconstitutional:
By giving scholarship money to students who attend sectarian-but not
"pervasively" sectarian-universities, Colorado necessarily and explicitly
discriminates among religious institutions, extending scholarships to
students at some religious institutions, but not those deemed too
thoroughly "sectarian" by government officials. The sole function and
purpose of the challenged provisions of Colorado law.., is to exclude
some but not all religious institutions on the basis of the stated criteria.
99
Indeed, the court declared that the Colorado scholarship program was "more
problematic than the Minnesota law invalidated in Larson[,] 100because the
Colorado Scholarship program was "expressly based on the degree of religiosity
of the institution"101 and discriminated "among religious institutions on the basis
of the pervasiveness or intensity of their belief."10 2 Further, the denominational
neutrality principle applies to state funding laws "just as much as to other
94. Id. at 1261. As Judge McConnell explained, this kind of intrusive scrutiny by government into
the beliefs and practices of religious institutions violates the Establishment Clause rule prohibiting
"excessive entanglement" between government and religion. Id.
95. Id. at 1261-62.
96. Id. at 1250.
97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
98. Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F. 3d at 1257.
99. Id. at 1258 (internal citations omitted).
100. Id. at 1259.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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laws." 103 Thus, the Establishment Clause simply does not permit a state to act
like Goldilocks and classify religious institutions as "too hot," or "too cold," or
'Just right" for purposes of inclusion in a state-funded scholarship program.
B. WASHINGTON'S DISCRIMINATORY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: RE-LITIGATING
JOSHUA DAVEY'S CASE
1. Davey s Free Exercise Claim
On September 28, 1999, Washington Governor Gary Locke wrote a letter to
Joshua Davey congratulating Davey on his selection as a recipient of a Promise
Scholarship.' 0 4  Locke praised Davey for his "outsthnding academic
achievements," expressed enthusiasm about the young man's "promising
future,"10 6 and explained why government support of college education is
essential to "meet the challenges" 107 of life in the twenty-first century:
Education is the great equalizer in our society. Regardless of gender,
race, ethnicity, or income, a quality education places all of us on a more
level playing field. I know this from personal experience. I was born into
an immigrant family and spent the first six years of my life in public
housing. Like you, I worked hard in high school and graduated with
honors. I attended college and then law school. My education contributed
greatly to my success, and I am personally committed to providing the
best possible educational opportunities for the young people of the state of
Washington.108
In light of what happened to Davey when he attempted to use his Promise
Scholarship to pursue his chosen course of study, Governor Locke's paean to
education as the "great equalizer" 109 seems almost cruelly ironic.
The state of Washington created the Promise Scholarship Program to assist
academically gifted students from low and moderate income families with the
expenses of attending college. 110  A Promise Scholarship was awarded to
students who graduated near the top of their class from a public or private high
school located in the state of Washington, whose family income was less than
135% of the State's median, and who enrolled at least half time in an accredited
college or university located in the state of Washington. 11' Since Davey met all
of these religiously-neutral requirements, he was awarded a Promise Scholarship
103. Id. at 1260.
104. I am relying heavily on my earlier work for the following description of Joshua Davey's case.
See Richard F. Duncan, Locked Out: Locke v. Davey and the Broken Promise of Equal Access, 8 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 699 (2006).
105. See Joint Appendix, Locke v. Davey, 2003 WL 21911178, at *55 (No. 02-1315) (Letter from
Governor Gary Locke to Joshua Davey (Sept. 28, 1999)) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *56.
109. Id.
110. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-16 (2004).
111. Id. at716.
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worth $1,125 for his first year of college and $1,542 for his second year.112
Promise Scholarships "are funded through the State's general fund" and can be
used to pay "any education-related expense, including room and board."'
1 13
However, when Davey enrolled in Northwest CollegeI14 and attempted to use
his Promise Scholarship to defray his educational expenses, he discovered that
there was one additional requirement designed to protect the interests of
Washington taxpayers who oppose supporting the education of prospective
members of the clergy even under a generally-applicable scholarship
program.115 This final requirement, which, unlike the others, was most certainly
not religiously-neutral, stated that Promise Scholars could use their scholarships
to pursue a degree in any course of study except "a devotional theology
degree." 1
16
Davey, who had planned to pursue a double major at Northwest College in
"pastoral
ministries and business management/administration,""11 7 was informed by
Northwest's financial aid director that to receive his Promise Scholarship funds
he would be required to "certify in writing that he was not pursuing" 118 a degree
in devotional theology at the college. Since he had no intention of foregoing an
education in pastoral ministries, he refused to sign the certification form, and, as
a result, his Promise Scholarship was forfeited and he received no funds. 
119
Davey sued in federal court claiming that the rule denying Promise
Scholarship funds to students who declare a major in devotional theology was
unconstitutional religious and viewpoint discrimination under the Free Exercise
and Free Speech Clauses of the United States Constitution. 120  The federal
district court ruled against Davey, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and held that the state of Washington violated the Free
Exercise Clause by targeting devotional theology majors such as Davey for
exclusion from the Promise Scholarship Program. 12 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari,122 reversed the Ninth Circuit, and held that a narrow exclusion
112. Id. The scholarship is awarded for the first year of postsecondary education and is renewable
for one year. Id. at 716-17.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 717 (stating that Davey enrolled at Northwest College, which is a private Christian
college that is eligible under the Promise Scholarship Program).
115. Id at 722-23.
116. Id. at 717. The exclusion of devotional theology majors is required by the Washington State
Constitution. Id. at 719 (stating that "[n]o public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied
to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment ....
(quoting WASH. CONST. art I, § 11)).
117. Id. at717.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at718.
121. Id. (discussing the conclusions drawn by the Ninth Circuit); see Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748,
757-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that Washington's Promise Scholarship Program was unconstitutional).
122. Davey, 299 F.3d 748, cert. granted, 538 U.S. 1031 (US. May 19, 2003) (No. 02-1315)
(granting certiorari only on the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause mandates that the State of
Washington fund religious instruction if it provides scholarships for secular college instruction); accord
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denying state funding for "vocational religious instruction"'123 does not violate
the free exercise rights of students, such as Davey, who are pursuing "religious
instruction that will prepare [them] for the ministry."124
The issue in Davey was not whether the Establishment Clause forbids states
from including devotional theology students from generally applicable
scholarship programs. Indeed, this was an easy issue, and the Court
unanimously declared that "there is no doubt that the State could, consistent with
the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in
devotional theology[.]" 125  The issue in Davey "concerns what the state must
fund."126  In other words, the decision concerns whether the Free Exercise
Clause is violated when a state discriminates against devotional theology
students by excluding them-and only them-from a scholarship available to
students pursuing any other course of study. As Professor Laycock has
observed, Washington's discriminatory scholarship program "actually paid
students not to major in [devotional] theology."'127
Davey's free exercise argument was a strong one that should have prevailed
under the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence. In its 1990 decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,128 the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not protect religious liberty against restrictive laws that are both
neutral and generally applicable. However, as the Court expressly emphasized
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,129 "[a] law burdening
religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo
the most rigorous of scrutiny."'130 Moreover, the Court in Lukumi clearly stated
that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its
face."131 Since the Promise Scholarship Program facially targeted devotional
theology majors for discriminatory exclusion from funding, Davey's free
exercise claim should have been an easy and certain winner under Smith and
Lukumi. Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Smith, certainly
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004) (identifying the issue presented as whether Washington can
deny funds to students preparing for the ministry without violating the Free Exercise Clause).
123. Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
124. Id. at 719; see id. at 725 (stating that "[g]iven the historic and substantial state interest at issue,
we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is
inherently constitutionally suspect...").
125. Id. at 719. That quotation accounts for the views of the seven Justices in the Davey majority.
The two dissenters, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, agreed that the Establishment Clause clearly
permits equal scholarships for all students, including devotional theology students. Id. at 728-29 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, stated that "[t]he establishment question would
not even be close[.]". Id. at 729.
126. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge Of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REv. 155, 171 (2004).
127. Id. at 160.
128. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
129. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
130. Id. at 546. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001).
131. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at533,
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thought so. 132 However, by a surprising vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court rejected
Davey's free exercise claim and upheld Washington's decision to exclude
devotional theology majors from its Promise Scholarship Program.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, at least on its face, is a very
narrow one limited essentially to the facts of the case - to "the Promise
Scholarship Program as currently operated by the state of Washington."'1
33
Although the opinion is mortally under-reasoned, it appears to be based on three
separate factors: the "relatively minor burden"134 the restriction placed on
Promise Scholars such as Davey, the State's interest in hewing to historical
tradition against taxpayer funds being used to subsidize "religious education for
the ministry[,]" 135 and the Court's desire to create room for "play in the joints"
between what the Establishment Clause permits and what the Free Exercise
Clause requires. 136
I believe Davey is wrongly decided under the Free Exercise Clause, because
even a minor burden is magnified greatly when a small minority is singled out
on the basis of religion and denied equal treatment. 13 7 However, the reach of the
holding of Davey is significantly limited by the fact that all the law required
Joshua Davey to do to keep his two-year scholarship was to delay declaring a
major in theology for two years.138 In other words, he could have used the
scholarship funds to cover his educational expenses at Northwest College, and
he could even have enrolled in devotional theology classes, so long as he did not
declare the forbidden major until the start of his junior year. The Court even
emphasized that "the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward
including religion in its benefits"139 by permitting students to attend "pervasively
sectarian schools" and to take "devotional theology courses" so long as they were
not majoring in devotional theology during the two-year period covered by the
scholarship.I4 The Court viewed this "relatively minor burden" as too
132. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726-27 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Professor Laycock
has summarized the logic of Davey's powerful argument as follows: "[flf funding is permitted and
discrimination is forbidden, it seemed to follow that a discriminatory refusal to fund is forbidden."
Laycock, supra note 126, at 156.
133. Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 721. The Washington Supreme Court has explained that its "state constitution prohibits
the taxpayers from being put in the position of paying for the religious instruction of aspirants to the
clergy with whose religious views they may disagree." Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d
1119, 1120 (Wash. 1989).
136. Davey, 540 U.S. at 719.
137. Id at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia put it in his dissenting opinion in Davey,
"[t]he indignity of being singled out for special burdens on the basis of one's religious calling is so
profound that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial." Id.
138. At the oral argument in Davey, Justice Stevens remarked that Mr. Davey's burden was "pretty
slight, because all he had to do was ... manage his curriculum a little differently." Transcript of Oral
Argument, Locke v. Davey, 2003 WL 22955928 at 22. Moreover, the Solicitor General of the State of
Washington, Narda Pierce, conceded at oral argument that "the statute says pursuing a degree in
theology, so I think it should be properly read by Northwest College as a student who is, during the
academic terms that are funded, working toward that degree in theology." Id. (emphasis added).
139. Davey, 5401U.S. at 724.
140. Id. at 724-25.
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insubstantial to trigger protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 141
In the fullness of time, Davey will probably be understood as a narrow and
temporary pause on the Court's inexorable journey toward neutrality under the
Constitution's religion clauses. There is no doubt that the Establishment Clause
permits devotional theology majors to receive neutral educational benefits, and
there should be no doubt that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits states from
targeting theology students for discriminatory exclusion. As Justice Scalia put it,
"[i]f the Religion Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce them, in hard
cases as well as easy ones."
14 2
However, even without a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, a case with
facts similar to Joshua Davey's should prevail if brought under the Establishment
Clause and the rule forbidding denominational discrimination.
2. Re-litigating Locke v. Davey Under the Establishment Clause
When I teach Locke v. Davey, I ask my students how we should proceed if
someone situated like Joshua Davey were to walk into our office and ask us to
represent him. Since I raise this issue shortly after we have covered Larson v.
Valente, inevitably someone in the class suggests that we should make an effort
to re-litigate Locke v. Davey as a denominational discrimination case under
Larson and the Establishment Clause. So, without further ado, I will now draw a
rough sketch of how that claim should look.
Of course, my first task will be to establish that Washington's Promise
Scholarship Program discriminates among students pursuing theology degrees at
different sectarian colleges. In other words, does a student's ability to use his
Promise Scholarship to pursue a major in theology at a religious college depend
upon which religious college in the state of Washington he chooses to attend?
Remarkably, the Promise Scholarship Program seems to discriminate
brazenly among religions, because it appears to explicitly exclude "devotional
theology" majors while including "non-devotional theology" majors. As the
Supreme Court explained in Davey, the Program only prohibits the funding of
students pursuing "degrees that are 'devotional in nature or designed to induce
religious faith."'143 Washington's distinction between religious colleges that
teach theology from a "devotional" perspective and those that teach theology
from a "non-devotional" perspective, like Colorado's distinction between
"pervasively sectarian" and merely "sectarian" colleges, appears to be one that
discriminates "among religious institutions on the basis of the pervasiveness or
intensity of their belief."1 4 But, of course, much depends upon how the state of
Washington defines "devotional theology" and how it enforces the exclusion of
"devotional theology" scholars from the Promise Scholarship Program.
141. Id. at 725.
142. Id. at 728 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
143. Id. at 716 (quoting Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
(No. 02-315), 2003 WL 21715040).
144. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1259 (10th Cir. 2008).
406 [Vol. NN
THE "CLEAREST COMMAND " OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
Presumably to avoid excessive entanglement between the State and
religious colleges, the state of Washington makes no effort to determine which
theology programs offered at religious colleges are "devotional" and which are
"non-devotional." Instead, the State requires each religious college to self-certify
whether any of its Promise Scholars is "pursuing a degree in devotional
theology."'145 Moreover, the State makes no effort to provide uniform standards
for distinguishing "devotional" from "non-devotional" theology; instead, the
State allows each school to decide subjectively whether its theology program is
the one or the other. Consider, for example, the remarkable testimony of John
Klacik, the Associate Director of the state of Washington's Higher Education
Coordinating Board,146 when he was deposed about the process for excluding
devotional theology majors from the Promise Scholarship Program:
Q. [By Mr. Davey's Attorney] Are there any other criteria bearing upon a
person's eligibility to receive funds under the scholarship?
A. [By Mr. Klacik] Well, to be a recipient - to be a recipient, the student
must also attend an eligible institution, must enroll for at least six hours or
more and cannot pursue a degree in theology.
Q. And could you define "pursue" in that context?
A. It's the institution's decision as to whether or not a student is pursuing
a degree in theology, so the institution's examination of the student's
record, enrollment.
Q. And could you define a degree in theology in this context?
A. In this context it's, again, the institution's decision to take a look at
that law and determine how it applies at their institution.!47
Mr. Klacik's understanding of the process for excluding devotional
theology majors was confirmed by another state official, Rebecca Collins, who,
when asked who determines which Promise Scholars are excluded from the
Scholarship Program for pursuing a degree in devotional theology, answered:
"The individual institutions determine - each one determines what they
determine to be a degree in theology."'1
4 8
The State relies on each religious college in Washington to self-certify
whether its own students are pursuing an excluded degree in "devotional
theology" or an included degree in "non-devotional theology." As such, the
classification turns on each institution's subjective definitions of those critically
important legal terms. Under this scheme, the State has practically guaranteed
that whether a student is excluded from the Scholarship Program for pursuing a
forbidden degree in "devotional theology" depends upon which religious college
145. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717 "The institution, rather than the State, determines whether the student's
major is devotional." Id.
146. Joint Appendix, supra note 105, at *126 (Excerpts of Deposition of John KIacik).
147. Id.
148. Joint Appendix, supra note 105, at *137 (Excerpts of Deposition of Rebecca Collins).
Moreover, when asked directly by Mr. Davey's attorney whether "the decision as to who is or is not
pursuing a degree in theology rests with the institution[,]" Ms. Collins replied only "Yes." Id. at *138.
Ms. Collins is the Director of Education Services for the Washington State Higher Education
Coordinating Board. See Joint Appendix, supra note 105, at *88 (Declaration of Becki Collins).
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in the state he or she attends. This is so because different schools will apply
different subjective definitions of "devotional theology," which, in turn, will
result in theology majors attending some religious colleges being excluded from
the Program while theology majors attending other religious colleges are
included in the Program.
When we discuss this issue in the classroom, I ask my students how they
think I would administer the exclusion of "devotional theology" majors if I were
suddenly appointed the President of a religious college in the state of
Washington. Would I be willing to certify that students majoring at my school
in "Pastoral Ministries" or "Religious Studies" or "Theology" were not pursuing a
forbidden course of study in "devotional theology" and thus were eligible to
receive Promise Scholarship funds? I would do so in a heartbeat and in perfect
good faith.
For example, Joshua Davey never declared a major in "devotional theology"
or even "theology." Rather, he was pursuing a double major in "pastoral
ministries and business management/administration." 149  Unless the state of
Washington provided me with a clear and generally applicable definition of
"devotional theology," I would not hesitate to certify that Mr. Davey was not
pursuing a devotional theology degree. Why should I think that my college's
program in "pastoral ministries" was within the forbidden, but undefined,
category of "devotional theology"? My college's pastoral ministries program is
an academically rigorous one involving serious study of many academic
subjects, including ancient language, history, culture and hermeneutics, not one
that is properly classified as amounting to purely religious "devotion" or
worship.
The point is not that it is possible to "game" the state of Washington's
subjective self-certification process for determining which theology programs
are included in the Scholarship Program.150 Rather, my point is that individual
religious colleges are likely to employ different subjective definitions to the
legally crucial terms "devotional theology" and "non-devotional theology" and
this will result in denominational discrimination among Promise Scholars
pursuing degrees in religious studies.
For example, although some religious colleges in the state of Washington
would likely be willing to certify that their Promise Scholarship students
majoring in religious studies are not pursuing a degree in "devotional theology"
and therefore are eligible to receive funding under the Promise Scholarship
Program, 151 the administration of Joshua Davey's college bent over backwards
149. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
150. However the state's total abdication to individual colleges to self-certify their own theology
programs is certainly conducive to gaming, because there appears to be no governmental review of the
self-certification process. The combination of deferential self-certification and fiscal self-interest creates
a fertile field for "gaming" the system.
151. I have been told by well-informed sources that some religious colleges in the state of
Washington did indeed self-certify their religious studies programs as not "devotional theology." As I
outlined above, in the absence of objective guidelines defining the crucial legal terms, it is possible to
decide in good faith that the rigorous academic study of religion is scholarly and therefore not
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to comply with what it believed to be "the spirit of the law.., that separates the
church and state" in Washington.152 Indeed, Ms. Lana Walter, the director of
financial aid at Northwest College, told students that, even if they had not yet
declared a major in religious studies, they "should not accept this award no
matter what" if their "plan [was] to become a minister or to change [their] major
to Religious Studies." 53
If Locke v. Davey were re-litigated as a denominational discrimination case
under the Establishment Clause, it might be possible for the student's attorneys
to build a record demonstrating that whether theology students are included in
(or excluded from) the Scholarship Program depends upon which religious
college in Washington the student chooses to attend. This would shift the
burden to the State to justify its denominational discrimination by demonstrating
a compelling interest in preferring some religious colleges over others. As in
Colorado Christian University, Washington's criteria for "exclud[ing] some but
not all",154 theology students from the Promise Scholarship Program amounts to
unconstitutional denominational discrimination under Larson v. Valente.
155
IV. CONCLUSION
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Larson v. Valente, the
"clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."'156 This doctrine is
perhaps best understood as creating a categorical rule forbidding, in the absence
of a compelling justification, laws that allocate benefits or burdens by classifying
along religious or sectarian lines. 
157
Although it is rare for the government to discriminate between or among
different religions, some states do discriminate along religious lines when
awarding college scholarships to young men and women. For example, the
scholarship program struck down in Colorado Christian University v. Weaver,
awarded public scholarships to eligible students attending any in-state college or
university, including religious colleges so long as they were not "pervasively
sectarian."158  Under this religious classification scheme, Colorado awarded
scholarships to students attending non-pervasively sectarian colleges, including a
Methodist university and a Roman Catholic university, but refused to award
scholarships to otherwise eligible students attending pervasively sectarian
"devotional." See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
152. Joint Appendix, supra note 105, at *156 (Excerpts of Deposition of Lana J. Walter).
153. Id. Ms. Walter further explained her position as follows: "I say to the student, [i]f you are
planning to become a minister, no matter what your major is, this warrant, this check, this award, is not
intended to go to a student in your position." Jd. at 157.
154. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F. 3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). See supra notes 98-
103 and accompanying text.
155. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
156. Id. at 244.
157. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
158. See Colo. Christian Univ., 534 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).
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Christian and Buddhist universities. 159 The Tenth Circuit correctly held that this
discriminatory scholarship program amounted to unconstitutional
denominational discrimination, because it classified "among religious institutions
on the basis of the pervasiveness or intensity of their belief."'
160
This article finally analyzed Locke v. Davey, a recent free exercise decision
of the Supreme Court concerning a scholarship program, created by the state of
Washington, that allowed eligible students to use their scholarship funds to
attend any public or private college located in the state of Washington and to
pursue a degree in any course of study except "a devotional theology degree."'
161
The question presented in Davey was whether this exclusion of devotional
theology majors from an otherwise generally available scholarship program
violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court rejected Davey's free
exercise claim in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that, although
short on reasoned analysis, appears to be based on three separate factors: the
"relatively minor burden"162 the restriction placed on Promise Scholars such as
Davey, the State's interest in hewing to historical tradition against taxpayer funds
being used to subsidize "religious education for the ministry[,]" 16and the Court's
desire to create room for "play in the joints" between what the Establishment
Clause permits and what the Free Exercise Clause requires.164
This article suggests that if the facts of Davey were re-litigated under the
Establishment Clause rather than under the Free Exercise Clause, the exclusion
of students pursuing degrees in devotional theology might well be seen as
unconstitutional denominational discrimination under Larson. This is so
because the state of Washington does not exclude all students pursuing a degree
in theology from the scholarship program. Only those studying theology from a
"devotional" perspective are excluded.
Moreover, presumabl5i to avoid excessive entanglement between the State
and religious colleges, the state of Washington makes no effort to determine
which theology programs offered at religious colleges are "devotional" and
which are "non-devotional." Instead, the State requires each religious college to
self-certify whether any of its Promise Scholars is "pursuing a degree in
devotional theology." 165 Further, the State makes no effort to provide uniform
standards for distinguishing "devotional" from "non-devotional" theology;
instead, the State allows each school to decide subjectively whether its theology
program is the one or the other.
Thus, if Locke v. Davey were re-litigated as a denominational
discrimination case under the Establishment Clause, it might be possible for the
159. See id.
160. Id. at 1259.
161. 540 U.S. 712, 717 (2004). See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
162. Davey, 540 U.S. at 725.
163. Id. at 721.
164. Id. at 719.
165. Id. at 717. "The institution, rather than the State, determines whether the student's major is
devotional." Id.
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student's attorneys to build a record demonstrating that whether theology
students are included in (or excluded from) the Scholarship Program depends
upon which religious college in Washington the student chooses to attend. This
would shift the burden to the State to justify its denominational discrimination
by demonstrating a compelling interest in preferring some religious colleges
over others. As in Colorado Christian University, Washington's criteria for
"exclud[ing] some but not all" 166 theology students from the Promise
Scholarship Program might well be recognized as unconstitutional
denominational discrimination under Larson v. Valente.
166. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). See supra notes 98-
103 and accompanying text.
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